PEC
2.1 Syntax Definition 1 (Domain Language). A domain language is a tuple F, A, V, vals, I, ≤,0 consisting of a finite non-empty set F of fluents, a finite set A of actions, a finite nonempty set V of values such that {True, False} ⊆ V, a function vals : F ∪ A → 2 V \ ∅, a non-empty set I of instants and a minimum element0 ∈ I w.r.t. a total ordering ≤ over I. For A ∈ A we impose vals(A) = {True, False}. Example 1. An appropriate domain language for Scenario 1 would be F C , A C , V C , vals C , N, ≤ N , 0 where, F C = {Coin}, A C = {Toss}, V C = {True, False, Heads, Tails}, vals C (Coin) = {Heads, Tails} and vals C (Toss) = {True, False}, N is the set of natural numbers (including 0), and ≤ N is the standard total ordering between naturals. Scenario 2 could be captured by a language indicates that the patient initially has a rash, and that she takes the medicine and the bacterial infection is absent at instant 3.
Definition 4 (State, Partial State, Fluent State). A state S is a set of literals, exactly one for each F ∈ F and A ∈ A. A partial state is a subset X ⊆ S of a state S. Given a partial state X, we call its subset containing all and only the fluent literals in X a partial fluent state, and we denote it as X↾F. For a state S we call S↾F a fluent state. We also define X↾A as the subset of X containing all and only the action literals in X. The set of all states is denoted by S, the set of all partial states is denoted by X , and we useS andX to denote the sets {S↾F | S ∈ S} and {X↾F | X ∈ X } respectively. A ↾F = {Bacteria = Resistant, Rash = Absent}. Any arbitrary subset of S 1 A , e.g. X 1 A = {Rash = Absent, ¬TakesMedicine}, is a partial state, whereas any arbitrary subset of S 1 A ↾F, e.g. X 1 A ↾F = {Rash = Absent}, is a partial fluent state.
Definition 5 (Outcome, Projection Functions
). An outcome is a pair of the form (X, P + ).
The two projection functions χ and π are such that χ((X, P + )) =X and π((X, P + )) = P + for any outcome. The set of all outcomesX × (0, 1] will be denoted by O. We now introduce the standard propositions of our language: v-propositions are used to declare which value a fluent may possibly take. C-propositions are used to model the causal relationships of a domain, i-propositions declare the initial conditions, p-propositions are for the action occurrences, and h-propositions state that a given i-formula holds.
Definition 6 (Weight of a Set of Outcomes). Given a finite set

Definition 7 (v-proposition). A v-proposition has the form
where m ≥ 1 and {V 1 , . . . , V m } = vals(F ).
Definition 8 (c-proposition, Head and Body of a c-proposition). A c-proposition has the form
where
is a formula such that θ |= A = True for at least one A ∈ A, and π({O 1 , . . . , O m }) = 1. head(C) = θ and body(C) = {O 1 , . . . , O m } are the head and body of C, respectively. We often omit O i from body(C) if χ(O i ) = ∅ (leaving it implicit since π({O 1 , . . . , O m }) = 1).
Definition 9 (i-proposition). An i-proposition has the form
Definition 10 (p-proposition). A p-proposition has the form
A performed-at I
where I is such that I < I ′ for some other I ′ ∈ I.
Definition 11 (Domain Description). A domain description is a finite set D of vpropositions, c-propositions, p-propositions and i-propositions such that: i) for any two distinct c-propositions in D with bodies θ and θ ′ , θ |= ¬θ ′ , ii) D contains exactly one i-proposition, and iii) D contains exactly one v-proposition for each F ∈ F.
Example 4. Scenario 1 can be modeled using the following domain description D C :
Coin takes-values {Heads, Tails} (C1)
Toss causes-one-of
where (C1) is a v-proposition, (C2) is an i-proposition, (C3) is a c-proposition and (C4) is a p-proposition.
Example 5. Scenario 2 can be modeled using the following domain description D A :
TakesMedicine performed-at 3
where (A1) and (A2) are v-propositions, (A3) is an i-proposition, (A4) and (A5) are cpropositions, (A6) and (A7) are p-propositions.
Finally, we introduce h-propositions, whose role is that of being entailed by domain descriptions:
Definition 12 (h-proposition). An h-proposition has the form ϕ holds-with-prob P.
for some i-formula ϕ.
For example, we will show in the following sections the formal sense in which D C entails the h-proposition [Coin = Heads]@2 holds-with-prob 0.51.
Semantics
For the remainder of this paper, D is an arbitrary domain description. 
Definition 13 (Worlds
The definition of ||= is recursively extended for arbitrary i-formulas as follows: if ϕ and ϕ ′ are i-formulas, we write W ||= ϕ ∧ ϕ ′ iff W ||= ϕ and W ||= ′ , and W ||= ¬ϕ iff W || = ϕ. ∨ and → are taken as shorthand in the usual way. Given a (possibly empty) set ∆ of i-formulas, we write W ||= ∆ iff W ||= ψ for all ψ ∈ ∆. Given an i-formula ϕ and a set ∆ of i-formulas we write ∆ ||= ϕ if for all W ∈ W such that W ||= ∆, W ||= ϕ also holds. For two i-formulas ψ and ϕ, we use ψ ||= ϕ as a shorthand for {ψ} ||= ϕ, and ||= ϕ as a shorthand for ∅ ||= ϕ.
Example 6. Three worlds for Scenario 1 can be specified as follows:
1 The symbols ||= and || = should not be confused with |= and |= which we use for the classical propositional entailment 
. . , O n respectively, where I 1 , . . . , I n are ordered w.r.t. ≤, and
If a world W satisfies the justified change condition for some effect choice ec, W and ec are said to be consistent with each other w.r.t. D.
Example 11. Let D C be as in Example 4, W 1 , W 2 be as in Example 6, and ec 1 be defined as in Example 9. For any two instants I, I ′ ∈ N with
For W to satisfy the justified change condition w.r.t. D C , equation (6) would require A well-behaved world can have multiple traces, as shown in the following example.
Example 13. Let D C be as in Example 4, W 3 be as in Example 6 and ic 1 , ec 2 , ec 3 be as defined in Example 9. World W 3 has two distinct traces, tr ′ 3 = (ic 1 , ec 2 ) and tr ′′ 3 = (ic 1 , ec 3 ), which disagree on the effect choice: in one case the robot manages to toss the coin producing Coin = Heads as a result (i.e., tr ′ 3 (1) = ({Coin = Heads}, 0.49)) whereas in the other case the robot fails to grab the coin (i.e., tr ′′ 3 (1) = (∅, 0.02)) leaving Coin = Heads to hold. These two traces are also the only traces of this world w.r.t. D C .
However, the converse is not true: Proposition 1. Given a candidate trace tr, there is at most one world W that is wellbehaved w.r.t. D and tr is a trace of W w.r.t. D.
Proof. First we prove by induction on dom(tr) = {I 1 , . . . , I m } that if there are two (not necessarily distinct) well-behaved worlds
In the following, let tr = (ic, ec). Notice that since both W ′ 1 and
)↾F (and assume I 0 to be0). Using the justified change condition in the form (6), we get both 
Definition 28
Example 14. Let D C be as in Example 4 and W 3 be as Example 6. As discussed in Example 13, W 3 has exactly two traces tr ′ 3 = (ic 1 , ec 2 ) and tr ′′ 3 = (ic 1 , ec 3 ). Equations (7) and (9) yield: 
Definition 31 (Entailment for Domain Descriptions). Given a domain description D and an i-formula ϕ, we say that the h-proposition ϕ holds-with-prob P is entailed by D iff M * D (ϕ) = P . 
The reader can verify that [Coin = Heads]@0 yields
and from this we can derive that D C entails the two following h-propositions: 
Properties of a model
We now introduce the concept of a probability function, adapted from [15] :
Definition 32 (Probability Function, Conditional Probability). A probability function (over i-formulas) is a function p : Φ → [0, 1] such that:
The associated conditional probability of ϕ given ψ is defined as
for p(ψ) = 0.
We will show that M * D is a probability function. To prove this, first we need to introduce some auxiliary definitions: 
and consider the following well-behaved world w.r.t. D ′ : for some state S and some fluent stateS ′ , then there is an arrow from a node representing S↾F to a node representingS ′ which is labelled S↾A, p. The arrow is omitted in some trivial cases (for instance when the set of actions is empty). Similarly, the transition function for the antibiotic domain can be pictured as follows: 
Proof. We show that W is well-behaved w.r.t. D if and only if the following conditions are met:
1. It is fluent-indistinguishable up to I n from some well-behaved world W ′ w.r.t. D <In , 2. For all actions A and instants I ≥ I n , A ∈ W (I) if and only if I = I n and the p-proposition A performed-at I n is in D,
For the "only if" subproof, condition 1, let tr = tr( ⊲⊳ )@ ⊲⊳ , tr(I 1 )@I 1 , . . . , tr(I n )@I n be an arbitrary trace of W w.r.t.
D, and consider the trace tr = tr( ⊲⊳ )@ ⊲⊳ , tr(I 1 )@I 1 , . . . , tr(I n−1 )@I n−1 . Since D and D <In differ only by one p-proposition occurring at I n and tr ′ does not mention any instant strictly greater than I n−1 , it is possible to find a world W ′ which has trace tr ′ w.r.t. D <In , and which is fluent-indistinguishable from W up to instant I n . Condition 2 follows directly from the definition of CWA for actions. For condition 3, the justified change condition in the form (6) implies W (I)↾F = W (I n ) ⊕ χ(O j ) for some O j ∈ head(C) and all instants I > I n .
The "if" part of the subproof can be derived by considering that any world satisfying the three conditions above is well-behaved (see Definitions 15, 19, 22, 33 and 34) .
Part ii) is not proved formally here, but the example that follows demonstrates it in a particular case. 
and
and note that π(O ′ ) = 0.49 is the weight associated with the transition from
. Using this we can write
which is the expression we were looking for.
Lemma 1. For any D and any state S,
Proof. We prove this by cases: Case 1. If there is no c-proposition C such that S |= body(C), then it follows from Definition 35 that
which is what we want. Case 2. Let C be the unique c-proposition such that S |= body(C). Then, applying the definition of t D from Definition 35 gives
Notice that for a fixed outcome O, it is impossible to have O ∈ tset D (S,S ′ ) and O ∈ tset D (S,S ′′ ) for two distinct fluent statesS ′ ,S ′′ as this would implyS ′ = (S↾F)⊕χ(O) = S ′′ . Hence it is sufficient to show that {O ∈ tset D (S,S ′ ) |S ′ ∈S} = head(C), as this implies that the sum (11) equals 1 since π(head(C)) = 1 by definition of a c-proposition.
By definition of a transition set, {O ∈ tset Proof. We show that for any domain description, requirements 1 and 2 as in Definition 32 are always satisfied by a model of that domain description.
Proof of requirement 1. We need to show that for any ψ such that W ||= ψ for all
where the second equality is guaranteed by the fact that M D (W ) = 0 when W is not well-behaved. For a generic domain description D we define
Informally, occ(D) is the set of all instants at which some cause is occurring in some wellbehaved world w.r.t. D. We let M ≤I be the model of D ≤I and M ∅ be the model of D ∅ .
We prove (12) by induction on occ(D). Notice that for I = max I∈I (occ(D))) it is the case that occ(D ≤I ) = occ(D).
Base case. We consider D ∅ first. Since there are no p-propositions in D ∅ , occ(D ∅ ) = ∅ and the sum (12) becomes:
Let {O 1 , . . . , O m } be the outcomes occurring in the only i-proposition of D ∅ . We prove that the well-behaved worlds w.r.t. D ∅ are exactly those W s taking the form W (I)↾F = χ(O i ) and ¬A ∈ W (I) for all instants I and all action symbols A.
If W has this form, then it satisfies CWA (as there are no p-propositions in D ∅ , and this is consistent with ¬A ∈ W (I) for all I and A), it satisfies the initial condition w.r.t. D ∅ as O i is an initial choice w.r.t. D ∅ and W (0)↾F = χ(O i ) by definition, and finally it also satisfies the justified change condition in the form (6) as occ D ∅ (W ) = ∅, which in turn forces W (I)↾F = W (I ′ )↾F for all I and I ′ . The fact that if W is well-behaved then it is of the form above follows from a straightforward inversion of the previous reasoning.
Notice that each of these well-behaved worlds is consistent with a unique trace O i @ ⊲⊳ for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and let W i denote the world having trace
and (13) evaluates to:
as π({O 1 , . . . , O m }) = 1 by Definition 9 of an i-proposition. Inductive step. Let occ(D) = {I 1 , . . . , I n } for n ≥ 0, where I 1 , . . . , I n are ordered w.r.t. ≤. Assume that M * <I i (ψ) = 1 for some i ≤ n. We prove that M * ≤I i (ψ) = 1. Proposition 3 implies that if W is a well-behaved world w.r.t. D ≤I i and I i ∈ occ D (W ), there exists a well-behaved world W ′ w.r.t. D <I i which is fluent-indistinguishable from W up to I i and such that:
whereS is the fluent state taken by W at instants I > I i , and notice that 15 also holds when
Equation (15) and the inductive hypothesis allow us to turn Equation (12) into:
where we have used Lemma 1 in the fourth equality. Proof of requirement 2. Let ϕ and ψ be two i-formulas such that ϕ ||= ¬ψ. Obviously, since ϕ ||= ¬ψ if for some W ∈ W, W ||= ϕ, then W || = ψ and vice-versa, hence
An immediate consequence of the previous proposition is the following one:
Example entailments
The following are example entailments from the formalisation of Scenario 1 and 2. Notice that from (||=A4) and (||=A5) we can calculate the conditional probability that the medicine has cured the infection at instant 4, i.e. [Bacteria = Absent]@4, given that no sign of rash is visible at the end of the treatment, i.e. [Rash = Absent]@4. Applying (10) gives that this probability equals 0.650769/0.733846 ≈ 0.887.
Translation
To aid the reader's intuition, we outline the translation of a domain description D into an answer set program. The idea is that of generating all the traces of a domain description as distinct stable models of the translated domain description. These traces can then be processed by an external tool such as AWK in order to calculate the probability of given queries.
In the following, we restrict the domain language to be such that I is a finite interval {0, 1, . . . , maxinst} of N, with0 = 0 and ≤=≤ N being the usual ordering relation between naturals.
Translation of the domain-dependent part
We start by introducing the full translation of the coin domain description from Example 4. , true) , I)).
performed(toss, 1).
(TC4)
where, informally, the set of clauses (TC0) is the translation of the three sorts F, A and I; (TC1), (TC2) and (TC4) are the translation of (C1), (C2) and (C4) respectively; (TC3.1), (TC3.2) and (TC3.3) together give the translation of (C3), and each of them corresponds to an outcome in the corresponding c-proposition;
Since in logic programming lowercase letters are conventionally used for constants, we switch to that convention by letting lower case letters be the logic programming counterparts of (upper case) constants in PEC so that e.g. f is regarded as the translated fluent F . Furthermore, literals of the form X = V are translated into pairs of the form (x, v).
The three sorts F, A and I are translated to the three sets {fluent(f ) | F ∈ F}, {action(a) | A ∈ A} and {instant(i) | I ∈ I} respectively (see e.g. (TC0) in Example 18).
Let C be a c-proposition of the generic form (2):
but first considering the case where θ is a conjunction of the form 1 , v 1 ), I) ), . . . , holds(((x j , v j ), I)).
Fix an enumeration (without repetitions) of all the c-propositions in D, and let C be the nth proposition occurring in such enumeration. Then, C is translated to: 
) holds((takesMedicine, true), I), holds((bacteria, resistant), I).
If θ is not a conjunction of literals, then represent it in Disjunctive Normal Form, i.e. in the form θ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ θ n with θ 1 , . . . , θ n conjunctions of literals, and then for each rule write the precondition of each causes-one-of clause in the disjunctive form:
The translation of i-propositions works in a very similar way: if J is an i-proposition of the general form (3):
initially-one-of {O 1 , O 2 , . . . , O m } then its translation is given by the following set of clauses: initialCondition((id 0 1 , 9/10)).
Finally, the translation of p-propositions and v-propositions is straightforward: any generic p-proposition of the form (4) is translated to performed(a, i).
and we write P D for the set of all translated p-propositions in D, while any v-proposition of the form (1) is translated to: 
possVal(rash, present).
(TA2) possVal(rash, absent).
performed(takesMedicine, 1).
(TA6)
performed(takesMedicine, 3).
Since P D and V D contain only ground facts which clearly correspond to their semantic counterparts (i.e., p-propositions and v-propositions) we are not going to discuss their correctness in close detail.
We write Π D for the set of translated propositions from D, e.g. if D C is the coin toss domain, Π D C = (TC0-4).
Translation of the domain-independent part
We define the domain-independent part of our theory to be:
possVal(A, true) ← action(A). (PEC1) possVal(A, false) ← action(A). fluentOrAction(X) ← fluent(X); action(X).
(PEC2)
inOcc(I) ← instant(I), causesOutcome(O, I).
(PEC6) , true) , I)), not performed(A, I).
⊥ ← action(A), instant(I), (PEC10) not holds(((A, true), I)), performed(A, I).
(PEC1-4) implement the basic predicates and sorts of PEC, namely: (PEC1) states that actions are boolean; (PEC2) defines a characteristic predicate for F ∪ A; (PEC3) and (PEC4) define literals and i-literals, respectively. Proving that these predicates correctly characterise the sorts and sets they stand for is trivial and is omitted here.
Intuitively, axioms (PEC5-14) correspond to the definitions introduced in the previous section, namely: (PEC5) corresponds to Definition 13, (PEC6) defines a characteristic predicate for occ as in Definition 16, (PEC7) and (PEC12-14) correspond to justified change, (PEC8) and (PEC11) corresponds to the initial condition, (PEC9) and (PEC10) correspond to CWA for actions.
We denote the domain-independent part of our theory, i.e. (PEC1-14) , by Π I . Notice that axioms (PEC9-14) are constraints, and in the following will be referred to as Π C .
Correctness
We now show that the provided translation is sound and complete with respect to the definitions given in the previous sections. This proof relies on the Splitting Theorem [10] , a useful tool to obtain the answer sets of a ground program. Informally, a set U of atoms is a splitting set for a program Π if, for every rule in Π, if U contains some atom in the head of such rule, then it also contains all the atoms occurring in that rule. For instance, if Π ′ = {a ← not b, b ← c, c} then {a, b, c}, ∅, {b, c} and {c} are splitting sets for Π ′ , whereas {a, b} and {a} are not.
A splitting set U splits an answer set program Π into a bottom program bot U (Π) and a top program top U (Π) = Π \ bot U (Π). With the program Π ′ defined as above,
The splitting set theorem states that the answer sets of Π are exactly those that can be expressed as X ∪ Y for X an answer set of bot U (Π) and Y an answer set of e U (top U (Π), X), where e U (Π, Z) for a generic program Π, set of atoms U and answer set Z denotes the partial evaluation of the program Π w.r.t. U which is defined as follows: a rule r is in e U (Π, Z) if and only if there exists a rule r ′ ∈ Π such that all literals in the body of r ′ with at least an atom of U occurring in them are also in Z, and the rule r is obtained from r ′ by removing all the occurrences of such literals. If we consider Π ′ and U ′ again and let X ′ be the only answer set {c} of bot
and notice that now we can split Π ′′ itself. If we let U ′′ = {b}, then bot U ′′ (Π ′′ ) = {b} and Π ′′′ = e U ′′ (top U ′′ (Π ′′ ), X ′′ ) = ∅ for the only answer set X ′′ = {b} of bot U ′′ (Π ′′ ). The answer sets of the original program Π ′ can now be obtained as X ′ ∪ X ′′ ∪ X ′′′ , where X ′ = {c} is the answer set of bot U ′ (Π ′ ), X ′′ = {b} is the answer set of bot U ′′ (Π ′′ ) = {c} ′ and X ′′′ = ∅ is the answer set of Π ′′′ . Then, the program Π ′ has only one answer set {b, c}.
In the following, we will assume that answer sets of a choice rule {a 1 , . . . , a n } are the power set {∅, {a 1 }, . . . , {a n }, {a 1 , a 2 }, . . . , {a 1 , . . . , a n }}, and that answer sets of a constrained choice rule X{a 1 , . . . , a n }Y are the answer sets of {a 1 , . . . , a n } with cardinality ≥ X and ≤ Y . Also, we assume that the only answer set of the program {p(X) : q(X), q(a 1 ), . . . , q(a n )}, where p(X) : q(X) is called a conditional literal, is {p(a 1 ), . . . , p(a n ), q(a 1 ), . . . , q(a n )}. Notice that conditional literal and choice rules can be combined so that e. Proof. Let Π = Π D ∪ Π I . We split Π with respect to the set U of all the possible groundings of the predicates fluent, action, instant, possVal and performed. The bottom bot U (Π) contains all the facts in Π D , and has a unique answer set Z I that includes a correct representation of F, A, I and the function vals.
We now split the partially evaluated top Π ′ = e U (top U (Π), Z I ) using U ′ = {holds(((x, v), i)) | X ∈ F ∪ A, V ∈ vals(X), I ∈ I}. The bottom bot U ′ (Π ′ ) consists only of (PEC5) and has answer sets that correspond to any possible world in the domain language, i.e., (PEC5) generates every possible function from instants to states, hence we are allowed to interpret world(((x, v), i)) ∈ Z as X = V ∈ W (I), and for a particular world W ∈ W we denote by Z W the corresponding answer set of bot U ′ (Π ′ ).
Notice that for any fixed W ∈ W the two sets of propositions
are independent of each other so we can evaluate their answer sets separately.
We start with the set Π ′ W . If a c-proposition C = θ causes-one-of {O 1 , O 2 , . . . , O m } in D is satisfied by W at instant I, i.e. W ||= [θ]@I, then also the preconditions of the translated c-proposition are satisfied (as Z W correctly represents W ), and Π ′ W will contain the facts causesOutcome((id n j , p), i) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and C being the nth c-proposition in the enumeration fixed during the translation process (see the previous section for reference), alongside the corresponding belongsTo facts which we assume correctly represent the ∈ relation for outcomes, i.e., belongsTo((x, v), id n j ) ∈ Π ′ W if and only if X = V ∈ O j . Conversely, if a fact of the form causesOutcome((id n j , p), i) belongs to Π ′ W then its preconditions of the form holds (((x, v) , i)) for appropriate literals (x, v) must be satisfied by Z W , hence there must be an appropriate C proposition in D such that its preconditions are satisfied in world W at instant I.
For a fixed I, if we denote by C W,I the set of facts of the form causesOutcome((id n j , p), i) that are in Π ′ W , what we have just shown yields:
If we now let U ′′ be a splitting set such that it contains all possible groundings of the causesOutcome predicate, we get that the the only answer set of bot U ′′ (Π ′ W ) is:
The partially evaluated top e U ′′ (Π ′ W , C W ) includes the set of atoms
where we have used (16) to derive the last equality. Therefore, we can interpret
is O W , and we now need to evaluate and find the answer sets of top U ′′′ (Σ ′ W ) which consists only of (PEC7).
The role of (PEC7) is to implement the effectChoice function. Indeed, for each instant We are now able to calculate the answer sets of the program Π \ Π C , which are given by the set 
Finally, we take into account the constraints, whose effect is that of implementing the Closed World Assumption and the effects of initialisation and persistence. Since (PEC9-14) are constraints, they eliminate those answer sets of Π that satisfy their bodies.
If we let Z W be the world encoded in an answer set Z of Π D ∪ Π I , (PEC9) and (PEC10) ensure that:
therefore the world encoded in Z W must satisfy CWA, i.e. definition 15.
Let now initially-one-of (O 1 , O 2 , . . . , O m ) be an i-proposition in D and Z W be as before. (PEC12) makes sure that:
which satisfies the initial condition, i.e. definition 17.
Finally we consider (PEC12-14). Let I, I ′ be two instants with I < I ′ as in definition 22, consider the world encoded in Z W and let W (I)↾F =S and W (I ′ )↾F =S ′ . Assume that the effectChoice function encoded in Z maps instants in inOcc D (W ) ∩ [I, I ′ ) to outcomes O 1 , O 2 , . . . , O n . Axiom (PEC14) makes sure thatS cannot be altered if I / ∈ inOcc D (W ). ThereforeS can only change at instants I ∈ inOcc D (W ). We now show thatS ′ is actually equal toS
. Both i) and ii) are forbidden by (PEC13) and (PEC14) respectively, by considering that the answer set Z correctly represents the semantic objects that it encodes.
Related Work
Although there is existing work on probabilistic reasoning about actions, most is based on Reiter's variant of Situation Calculus (SC) [16] , with focus on hypothetical rather than narrative reasoning. An exception is Prob-EC (see below).
Of the SC approaches, the Bacchus-Halpern-Levesque framework [1] is a cornerstone of early work integrating probabilistic knowledge with logical formalisms for reasoning about actions, and incorporates epistemic notions such as sensing actions. The Probabilistic Situation Calculus (PSC) [13] is extended to deal with knowledge-producing actions in [12] . A reasoning system based on PSC able to perform temporal projection has been implemented by the authors in Wolfram Mathematica [19] and uses Monte Carlo methods for tractability. The language PAL [2] focuses on building an elaboration tolerant representation for Markov Decision Processes. It is based on Language A [5] and oriented to counterfactual reasoning and observation assimilation. PAL uses two kinds of unknown variables -inertial and non-inertial -to achieve an elaboration tolerant representation of domains. The action language E+ [7] , based on C+ [6] , supports both non-deterministic and probabilistic actions. Its main focus is on providing algorithms for the efficient computation of plans.
To our knowledge, the Probabilistic Logic Programming Event Calculus (Prob-EC) [18] is the only EC-style language in this class of formalisms other than PEC able to support reasoning about explicit event occurrences (narratives). Unlike our framework, which has its own bespoke semantics, Prob-EC is a logic programming framework based on the probabilistic logic programming language ProbLog [3] and therefore inherits and exploits its semantics. In [18] Prob-EC is applied to human activity recognition. The authors describe how a set of long-term activities (LTAs) can be detected from a set of short-term activities (STAs). Such STAs, which constitute the input to the system, are treated as events happening at given instants and have probabilities attached. This is a somewhat different approach than PEC's, motivated by its application to activity recognition, analogous to attaching probabilities to p-propositions (rather than i-and c-propositions). In other words Prob-EC's focus is on representing probabilistic knowledge about event occurrences rather than about their general causal effects.
Summary
In this work, we present PEC, an EC variant for reasoning about actions in a narrative domain where actions can have probabilistic outcomes, and illustrated how for a wide subclass of domains it can be implemented in ASP in a sound and complete way. Unlike Prob-EC [18] which follows the "logic programming" tradition, our formalism belongs to the "action language" tradition (originating in [5] , but see also [8] for the first EC style action language), and therefore its own specialised semantics. This makes of PEC portable in the sense that it is independent of any particular computational implementation. Its semantics is defined in terms of (possible) worlds, with a view to adding epistemic features at a later date (see e.g. [14] , [17] ).
In our initial experimentation with adding epistemic features to PEC, we have focused on representing imperfect sensing actions and actions conditioned on knowledge acquired during the progression of the narrative. These features are similar to those in the EFEC extension of FEC [11] . We envisage including s-propositions such as which represents that the robot will toss again if it believes with a greater than 65% probability that the first toss resulted in Tails. Preliminary results indicate that our possible worlds semantics can be readily extended to cover these notions. There are several other ways in which the present work can be continued. For instance, the problem of elaboration tolerance, which plays an important role in classical reasoning about actions, needs to be reviewed and solved in our setting. This problem has already been tackled in [2] , but needs to be restated in our framework due to the different way in which we introduce probabilities in PEC. A related point is that of underspecification, i.e. what an agent can reasonably infer from a domain in which the initial conditions and the effects of actions are not entirely specified (even probabilistically). Finally, in our view a crucial point is that of computational efficiency. Indeed, the intractability of several computational problems arising in this setting (such as temporal projection) suggests that techniques (e.g. Monte Carlo Markov Chain) are needed to efficiently approximate the correct answer to a given query with an appropriate degree of confidence.
